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Establishing the Independence of Super
PACs: How to Distinguish the
Indistinguishable
Eli Evanst

INTRODUCTION

Super political action committees ("PACs") continue to
garner significant interest and scrutiny four years after the
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission' decision that
spawned them. This attention is due in part to the increasing
size of campaign expenditures via super PACs, as well as the
limited disclosure requirements for donors. While conventional
PACs can make contributions and expenditures to influence
federal elections, they must comply with the Federal Election
Campaign Act ("FECA") and their donors are subject to
contribution limits. 2 Conventional PACs can expressly advocate
on behalf of a clearly identified candidate, but a super PAC "can
only make independent expenditures and is barred from making
direct candidate contributions." 3 Additionally, super PACs differ
from conventional PACs because super PACs are "legally
entitled to raise donations in unlimited amounts." 4 This
flexibility stems from the idea that "[t]he absence of
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent ...
alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
B.S. 2012, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 2016, The University of
Chicago Law School.
1 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2 See Political Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595,
5596-97 (Feb. 7, 2007)
("FECA defines a 'political committee' as 'any committee, club, association, or other
group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a
calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a
calendar year."').
Richard Briffault, Super PACS, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012).
4
Id. at 1647.
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commitments from the candidate."5 Consequently, private
donors give most of their independent expenditures to super
PACs, which then funnel the money into political ads or other
means of influencing political opinion.6 In a recent decision,
however, the Second Circuit held that a super PAC may be
subject to campaign contribution limits if it is "functionally
indistinguishable" from a traditional PAC that makes limited
contributions to candidates. 7
In Vermont Right to Life Commission, Inc. v. Sorrell,8 the
Second Circuit addressed whether campaign contribution limits
apply to independent-expenditure-only ("IEO") organizations,
such as super PACs, when the IEOs are linked to direct
expenditure organizations ("DEO") like conventional PACs. The
Second Circuit's decision creates a much more rigorous test than
those established by other circuits, particularly the leading
opinion of the Fourth Circuit. 9 Put roughly: if it looks like a PAC
and acts like a PAC, then the government should regulate it like
a PAC.10
The Supreme Court will have a significant decision to make
if it grants certiorari to hear Vermont Right to Life. The Second
Circuit's precedent-shaking decision appears to open the door for
the Supreme Court to weaken super PACs, as well as create
incentives for super PACs to rely on indirect signaling to
coordinate their behavior with candidates they support. While
there are several potential approaches the Court could take in
resolving the circuit split, ultimately, the Second Circuit's
reasoning correctly recognizes and attacks the weaknesses of the
current regulatory regime. By looking to other areas of the law
for guidance, particularly areas of antitrust law that deal with
collusive behavior, the Court can further refine the Second
Circuit's approach to deal with the problem of distinguishing
collusion from other forms of speech.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)).
one commentator calculates that 84 percent of the "independent" expenditures
made in the 2012 presidential primary campaign were to super PACs. See Richard
Posner, Unlimited Campaign Spending-A Good Thing?, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG
(April 8, 2012), http: //www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/04/unlimited-campaign-spend
inga-good-thing-posner.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G5PM-THQK.
Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 145 (2d Cir. 2014).
8 Id. at 139.
9 See id. at 145.
'o See id.
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BACKGROUND

Constitutional Law as Applied to Campaign Finance
Regulations
1.

First Amendment and standard of review.

The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States states that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the

freedom of speech."" The text of the Constitution does not define
speech, however, nor does it provide explicit exceptions to the
First Amendment. 12 Over the past century, the Court has
identified certain categories of "low-value" speech that are no
longer protected. 1 3 Despite these limited exceptions, the Court
has stated that the First Amendment "'has its fullest and most
urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for
political office."' 4 The Court has also repeatedly recognized that
"debate on the qualifications of candidates [is] integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution." 15
These declarations affirm the importance of political speech
and provide it with full First Amendment protection.
Consequently, any laws that would burden political speech are
subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. 16 The government must
be able to prove the law "furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."1 7 Therefore, while
other parts of the Vermont statute dealing with campaign
contribution disclosure requirements are subject only to the
intermediate scrutiny1 8 level of "exacting scrutiny," the Court in

" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12

Id.

See Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (removing
protection for "fighting words"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (removing protection for false statements of fact if there is "actual malice"); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 571-72
(1980) (adding commercial speech to unprotected category); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23 (1973) ("[O]bscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
" Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)
(quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
15 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14).
16 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
17 Id. (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
464 (2007)).
"s Exacting scrutiny only requires a "substantial relation" between a disclosure
13
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and

Political expenditures and political contributions
distinguished.

The seminal case Buckley v. Valeo 20 distinguishes between
"political expenditures" and "political contributions" with regard
to First Amendment scrutiny. 21 This decision came on the heels
of a flurry of reforms to campaign finance and other political
behavior "triggered by the Watergate scandal." 22 The Court in
Buckley evaluated the FECA reporting requirements on political
committees, which the statute defined as "any committee, club,
association, or other group of persons which receives
contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in
an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000."23 However, the statute

failed to differentiate between the two forms of spending and
jointly described them as the "use of money or other valuable
assets 'for the purpose of . ..

influencing' the nomination or

election of candidates for federal office." 24 The Court reasoned
that this definition presented "vagueness problems, because
'political committee' is defined only in terms of amount of annual
'contributions' and 'expenditures,' and could be interpreted to
reach groups engaged purely in issue discussion." 25
To "avoid these line-drawing problems," the Court
subsequently narrowed the definition of political committees
and clarified what sort of payments they can receive from
donors:

requirement and a "sufficiently important" governmental interest while strict scrutiny
would require the Government to prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." Id. at 340, 366 (quoting Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
applies
'9 Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 136 ("The 'express advocacy' analysis ...
with equal force to "the major purpose" analysis here").
20 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
21 Id. at
19.
22 Id. at 68-69; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Political Process, 2 SMOLLA
& NIMMER
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 16:10 (2014) (describing Buckley as a 'landmark Supreme
Court decision involving political expenditures by individuals [that] came in 1976 on the
heels of the reforms triggered by the Watergate Scandal.").
23 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 n. 105 (quoting 2 U.S.C. §431(d) (current version at
§ 431(4)(A))).
24 Id. at 77 (quoting 2 U.S.C. §431(e), (f) (current version at §431(8), (9))).
25

Id. at 79.

557]

ESTABLISHING THE INDEPENDENCE OF SUPER PACs

561

To fulfill the purposes of the Act, [political committees]
need only encompass organizations that are under the
control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is
the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures
of candidates and of "political committees" so construed
can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be
addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign
related. 26
The Court has referred to this narrowing construction in
subsequent opinions and the "major purpose" test still holds
sway in most circuits.2 7
Political expenditures are the "amount[s] of money a person
or group can spend on political communication during a
campaign." 28 Political contributions, on the other hand, are the
"amount[s] that any one person or group may contribute to a
candidate or political committee." 29 The Supreme Court has held
"campaign finance restrictions must target quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance in order to survive First
on political
restrictions
scrutiny." 30 Thus,
Amendment
quid
pro quo
expenditures must "target what we have called
31
corruption or its appearance" while being "narrowly tailored"
to the task. 32 Restrictions on political contributions must also be
aimed at corruption, but only need to satisfy the less stringent
"closely drawn" standard of review. 33

26
Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 487 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added)).
27 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 170 n. 64. See also
Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 252 n. 6 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
28
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
29
Id. at 20.
30
Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 140 (citing McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441-42, 1450 (2014)). The Court has refused to extend strict scrutiny to
laws "preventing the appearance of influence or access, limiting distortions of the
marketplace of ideas, protecting the dissenting shareholders of corporate speakers,
equalizing the resources of candidates, or ensuring that government officials do not
devote excessive time to raising money." Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 182. (internal
citations omitted).
31 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441.
32 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
3 See Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 193 (2d Cir. 2011).
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Independent-expenditure-only groups.

There are two kinds of traditional PACs. The first are IEO
groups, which may promote political interests but do not
contribute directly to candidates. 34 In Citizens United, the Court
reaffirmed "[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of
an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only
undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but
also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 35
Because the Court reasons that there is no possibility for quid
pro quo corruption, limits on IEOs do not support a compelling
government interest and fail to satisfy scrutiny. 36
The second variety of PACs includes organizations that
make direct contributions to candidates. 37 The Court and several
circuits have held it "is unquestionably constitutional . . . [to

limit] contributions by individuals to particular candidate
committees." 38 When distinguishing between IEOs and DEOs,
the Court emphasized the "absence of prearrangement and
coordination." 39 While the courts seem fairly consistent in their
identification of IEOs and DEOs, the distinction is strongly
reliant on the assumption that IEOs cannot be controlled. It is
the
requirement
of
independence-the
absence
of
prearrangement and coordination-that "alleviates the danger
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate." 40 This assumption, however,
does not appear as reliable as it once did.

34 Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 121.
as 558 U.S. at 345 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47). The District of Columbia stated
the "Court has effectively held that there is no corrupting 'quid' for which a candidate
might in exchange offer a corrupt 'quo."' SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599
F.3d 686, 694-95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
3 See Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 121.
3 See id. See also California Medical Association v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S.
182, 197 (1981).
3 Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 140 (2d Cir. 2002).
3 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47).
4o

Id.
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Second Circuit Challenge to the Vermont Statute

Vermont Right to Life presented a challenge to a Vermont
state statute. 4 1 In relevant part, the law states a "political
committee [or PAC] . . . shall not accept contributions totaling
more than $2,000.00 from a single source, political committee, or
political party in any two-year general election cycle." 4 2 The
plaintiff, Vermont Right to Life Committee ("VRLC"), was "a
Vermont corporation that file[d] federal tax returns as a nonprofit entity under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)." 43 VRLC formed
Vermont Right to Life Committee-Fund for Independent
Political Expenditure ("VRLC-FIPE") "as a registered Vermont
political committee under the Vermont campaign finance
statutes." 44 VRLC-FIPE's formation resolution stipulated "that
it may not make monetary or in-kind contributions to
candidates, or coordinate the content, timing or distribution of
its communications or other activities with candidates or their
campaigns." 45 VRLC argued VRLC-FIPE was an IEO and
exempt from complying with the Vermont campaign finance
statute. 46 VRLC also formed Vermont Right to Life Committee,

Inc.

Political

Committee

("VRLC-PC"),

which

"engages

in

campaign activities, including making direct contributions to
pro-life political candidates." 47 Among other claims against
Vermont's statutory scheme, VRLC argued that §2805(a) was
unconstitutional as applied to VRLC-FIPE because it is an IEO,
despite its relationship to VRLC-PC. 48 The district court rejected
VRLC's argument and concluded that the provisions were
constitutional. 4 9
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court framed the issue in
the following way: "The only question here is whether the
statute's contribution limits are unconstitutional as applied to
[an IEO affiliated with a direct expenditure group], which claims

43

758 F.3d at 118.
Id. at 139 (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 2805(a)).
Id. at 122.

44

id.

45
'

Vt. Right for Life, 758 F.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted).
See id.

4

Id.

48

Id. at 139.

49

Vt. Right for Life, 758 F.3d at 128.

4'
42
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to be an independent-expenditure-only PAC."50 The Second
Circuit had previously held that "the state may impose
contribution limits on some groups .

.

. that directly contribute

or coordinate expenditures with campaigns."5 1 While VRLCFIPE did not itself satisfy these conditions, the district court
had found that "VRLC-FIPE [the lEO] is enmeshed financially
and organizationally with VRLC-PC, a PAC that makes direct
contributions to candidates." 52 Based on that finding of fact, the
Second Circuit held "Vermont's contribution limits as applied to
VRLC-FIPE are permitted." 53
The court reached this conclusion because the IEO and the
direct expenditure organization "cannot be functionally
distinguished." 5 4 The court focused on "the total overlap of staff
and resources, the fluidity of funds, and the lack of any
informational barrier between the entities" and concluded that
these
characteristics
made
the
two
organizations
"indistinguishable."5 5 The American Law Review summarized
the holding in the following way:
Under Vermont law, political committee was not [an]
independent expenditure only group, and thus was
subject to state's campaign finance restrictions, even
though
non-profit corporation
created committee
separately from political committee formed to engage in
campaign activities, and committees had separate bank
accounts, where funds were transferred freely between
committees' bank accounts, corporation had complete
control over both committees' structure and finances,
niembers of both committees were appointed by
corporation's president with approval of its board,
committees shared substantial overlap in membership,
and there was no point at which committee separated
itself from lines of communication between candidate,
corporation, and other committee.5 6

50 Id. at 139.
51 Id. at 145.
5

Id. at 141.

Vt. Right for Life, 758 F.3d at 145.
Id.
5 Id.
5
E.W.H., Annotation, Construction and application of provisions of corrupt
5

5
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The Second Circuit rejected the following per se rules
established by other circuits, and instead substituted deference
to the district court's finding of fact with regard to the
organization's structure.5 7
Other Circuits' Approaches to Distinguishing Between IEOs
and Direct Expenditure Organizations

C.

The Second Circuit's conclusion in Vermont Right to Life
particularly clashes with North CarolinaRight to Life, Inc. v.
Leake.5 8 In that case, the Fourth Circuit held that an IEO that
shared facilities and a "parent entity" with a DEO was still
"independent as a matter of law" based on the founding
documents of the organization.5 9
In Leake, a nonprofit whose purpose was advocacy for the
protection of human life and an anti-abortion political action
committee established by that same nonprofit brought a First
Amendment challenge against several of North Carolina's
campaign finance laws.60 The two organizations were housed in
the same building, shared a common advocacy goal, and had the
same management.6 1
The District Court invalidated a provision that allowed for
consideration of "contextual factors" in determining whether an
organization is advocating for a specific candidate; as a result,
the court found that the contribution limits at issue in the case
were unconstitutional. 6 2 The court "decided that the North
Carolina campaign finance statute that employed a 'reasonable
person' test and permitted examination of 'contextual factors,'
including timing, distribution, and cost, in determining whether
the 'essential nature' of a given communication was in support of
a specific candidate and therefore regulable, was vague,
overbroad, and violated the First Amendment on its face." 6 3

practices act regardingcontributions by corporation, 125 A.L.R. Fed. Supp. 1029 (1940).
5
See Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 141-44.
5 525 F.3d 274, 294 n. 8 (4th Cir. 2008).
5
Leake, 525 F.3d at 294 n. 8.
6 Id. at 274. See also Marilyn E. Phelan, Political Organizations, 2 NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: LAW AND TAXATION
6'
62
63

Leake, 525 F.3d at 306.
Id. at 280-81.
Phelan, supra note 60.

§ 20:10

(2015).
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed this reasoning, holding that the
North Carolina statute's use of "context to identify
communications in support of or opposition to a candidate" was
unconstitutional. 6 4 A dissenting judge voiced concern, however,
that this holding weakens the state's ability to regulate its own
elections. In particular, ignoring the context of communications
would allow organizations "to easily disguise their campaign
advocacy as issue advocacy, thereby avoiding regulation."6 5
Some conservative commentators have argued that this
approach burdensomely increases the costs contribution
regulations, particularly for small organizations. 6 6 "These laws
are expensive to comply with, so larger organizations with more
resources for accountants and lawyers-overhead that can be
better absorbed-have a comparative advantage over smaller
players." 67 According to this line of argument, the government

will be able to censor political speech, particularly that of small,
marginal political groups, under the guise of ordinary campaign
finance regulations designed to combat corruption.
Other circuits, applying Citizens United, "have concluded
that an anti-corruption rationale therefore cannot apply to
contributions to groups that engage only in independent
expenditures." 68 In particular, the D.C. Circuit held that
separate bank accounts between organizations are enough to
render an organization an IEO: "[the IEO] simply must ensure,
to avoid circumvention of individual contribution limits by its
donors, that its contributions to parties or candidates come from
a hard-money account."6 9 "Relying on Emily's List v. Federal
Election Commission,7 0 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia held that maintaining segregated bank accounts is
sufficient to ensure a division between funds raised by a federal
6
65

Leake, 525 F.3d at 308.
Id.

* Ilya Shapiro and Trevor Burrus, You Shouldn't Have to Register with the
Government to Engage in PoliticalAdvocacy, CATO AT LIBERTY (Nov. 5, 2014), available
http://www.cato.org/blog/america-you-shouldnt-have-register-government-orderat
engage-political-advocacy, archived at http://perma.cc/6BFW-PJ9D.
67

Id.

Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 140. For circuits applying that rationale, see Wisc.
Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 154 (7th Cir. 2011);
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1118-21 (9th Cir. 2011); N.C. Right to
Life, 525 F.3d at 295.
69 Emily's List v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
6

7o

Id.
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political committee for independent expenditures and those
raised by the same organization for candidate contributions." 7 1
D.

The Second Circuit's Interpretation is Compatible with
Supreme Court Precedent

The Supreme Court indicates that district and appellate
courts must find an "absence of prearrangement and
coordination." 72 Following this mandate the Supreme Court has
previously upheld limitations on contributions to "entities whose
relationships with candidates are sufficiently close to justify
concerns about corruption or the appearance thereof."7 3
However, these decisions do not deal specifically with IEOs.
In McConnell v. Federal Election Cornmission,74 various
parties challenged the constitutionality of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Congress designed the Act "to
purge national politics of what [is] conceived to be the pernicious
influence of 'big money' campaign contributions." 5 Political
parties and candidates had tried to circumvent FECA
restrictions "by using 'issue ads' that were specifically intended
to affect election results, but did not contain 'magic words,' such
as 'Vote Against Jane Doe."' 7 6 The Supreme Court ultimately
upheld the constitutionality of the Act's "limitations on
contributions to political parties because 'the close relationship

n Vt. Right to Life Comm'n, Inc. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376, 409 (D. Vt. 2012)
aff'd, 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Carey v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 791 F. Supp. 2d
121, 131-32 (D.D.C. 2011)).
71 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. See also Ala.
Democratic Conference v.
Broussard, 541 Fed. Appx. 931, 935 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) ("In prohibiting limits
on independent expenditures, Citizens United heavily emphasized the independent,
uncoordinated nature of those expenditures, which alleviates concerns about
corruption.").
1
Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 145 (citing Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce
v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 696 (9th Cir. 2010); accord McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 154-55 (2003) (upholding limitations on contributions to
national parties because "the close relationship between federal officeholders and the
national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that
relationship, ... have made all large soft-money contributions to national parties
suspect"); CaliforniaMedical Association, 453 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (upholding limitations on contributions to
"multicandidate political committees" because their close relationship with candidates
and office holders made them "conduits for contributions to candidates, and as such they
pose[d] a perceived threat of actual or potential corruption").
14 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
" Id. (quoting United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957)).
76 Id. at
94.
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between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as
the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, . .
have made all large soft-money contributions to national parties
suspect."'7 7 The Court's concerns about close collaboration
between candidates and national parties could be very relevant
to an analysis of possible collusion between IEOs and direct
expenditure organizations.
The Court similarly upheld contribution limitations for
"multicandidate political committees" in the earlier California
Medical Association v. Federal. Election Commission,7 8 where a
non-profit association of doctors and a multicandidate medical
PAC challenged the constitutionality of threatened FEC
enforcement action resulting from annual contributions to the
PAC in excess of $5,000.79 While the district court certified

questions regarding the constitutionality of the contribution
limits under FECA, the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the
challenged limits. The Supreme Court affirmed. Although this
case pre-dates the creation of super PACs, the Court's reasoning
is extremely relevant since the "multicandidate" PACs similarly
promote a variety of candidates instead of a single person. In
this case, the Court found that the "multicandidate" PACs' close
relationship with candidates and office holders made them
"conduits for contributions to candidates, and as such they
pose[d] a perceived threat of actual or potential corruption."80
The concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in both
McConnell and CaliforniaMedical Association appear to mirror
those of the Second Circuit and suggest that Vermont Right to
Life could be upheld upon review.
E.

Validity of the Circuit Split

Some commentators question whether a circuit split on this
issue really exists at all. They argue that while the Second
Circuit distinguished its position from the Fourth Circuit's
7 Long Beach Area Chamberof Commerce, 603 F.3d at 696 (quoting McConnell, 540
U.S. at 154-55).
78
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
79

Id.

so CaliforniaMedical Association, 453 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). See also id., at 197 (maj. op.) ("[T]he rights of a
contributor are similarly not impaired by limits on the amount he may give to a
multicandidate political committee ... which advocates the views and candidacies of a
number of candidates.").
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Leake, this distinction "incorrectly suggest[ed] that the Fourth
Circuit would rely entirely on a committee's formal intention,
expressed
in
organizational
documents,
to
function
independently." 81 Furthermore, "the Fourth Circuit made clear
that it would consider a showing that, notwithstanding stated
policies of independence or separate bank accounts, a
committee's independence was fictitious." 8 2 These commentators
conclude that even "if the Court does eventually address the
issue, the chances are good that it will side with the spender." 83
The Second Circuit, however, considers its own behavior a
deviation from the other circuits. More importantly, the Second
Circuit's approach in Vermont Right to Life, if not in direct
opposition to decisions like Leake, highlights how little guidance
currently exists for regulators and courts to assess the required
independence of lEOs. Addressing this circuit split allows the
Court to clarify the rules so that political committees can
structure themselves to retain independent expenditure
branches while avoiding liability. As lEOs continue to gain
importance in the political arena, clarification becomes more
important. 84

si Bob Bauer, Hybrids, MORE SOFr MONEY HARD LAW (July 8, 2014), available at
http: //www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2014/07/hybrids/, archived at http://perma.cc/
TU2K-4YKV.
82

id.

8

Id.
See id.:

84

Hybrid committees, or independent committees within a family of
organizations that includes contribution-making committees, are here to stay.
The reason is simple: there is no basis in Buckley for the position that an
organization making contributions can't also make expenditures, or operate
alongside related organizations that do. Contrary to what is often alleged, the
independence of consequence under the law is the independence of the
expenditure-an independence that keeps the candidate from shaping or
consulting on the expenditure and bolstering the chance that the committee
will be spending to her liking, for which she will be indebted. Committees can
establish the 'operational barriers' or 'organizational divides' that protect
against circumvention of this requirement.
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II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Per Se Rules
The D.C. Circuit has adopted a per se rule that requires an
lEO to maintain separate bank accounts.85 This rule is
extremely straightforward and low-cost for the courts to
implement. Unfortunately, it does little to protect against
collaboration between various branches of an organization.
Without additional restrictions, the DEO could simply direct the
spending of the IEO and thereby circumvent the rule.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit also has a per se rule that
requires legally distinct organizations based on foundational
documents. 86 Because it is a per se rule, the evidentiary burden
to establish independence is light and filing of the required
documents should be sufficiently straightforward for IEOs to
avoid concerns about non-compliance. Unfortunately, it does not
require financial independence between organizations and
makes collaboration easy.
B. Hybrid Approach
The Second Circuit's approach incorporates both the D.C.
Circuit and Fourth Circuit approaches with a multi-factor test.
The multi-factor test considers "the overlap of staff and
resources, the lack of financial independence, the coordination of
activities, and the flow of information between the entities."87
This test stems from the Second Circuit's belief that the other
circuits' approaches are not "enough to ensure there is a lack of
'prearrangement and coordination."' A separate bank account
may be relevant, but it does not prevent coordinated
expenditures-whereby funds are spent in coordination with the

8

See Emily's List, 581 F.3d at 12:

To prevent circumvention of contribution limits by individual donors, nonprofit entities may be required to make their own contributions to federal
candidates and parties out of a hard-money account .... But non-profit
entities are entitled to make their expenditures-such as advertisements, getout-the-vote efforts, and voter registration drives-out of a soft-money or
general treasury account that is not subject to source and amount limits.
86

8

See N.C. Right to Life, 525 F.3d at 294 n. 8.
Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 142.
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candidate."8 8 The Second Circuit's test places a greater burden
on the trial courts because the appellate courts will be beholden
to their findings of fact.89 Furthermore, the evidentiary costs of
establishing an information flow are likely to be higher. But the
Second Circuit's approach is still desirable because it takes care
to force a barrier between IE~s and DEOs. In particular,
"coordination of activities" is a broad limitation on interaction
between the groups.90 Such a limitation may carry efficiency
costs because groups cannot benefit from economies of scale but
should still help maintain the desired independent behavior of
the IE~s. In Vermont Right to Life, the Second Circuit identifies
at least two important state interests promoted by its approach.
First, avoiding either the appearance or reality of quid pro quo
corruption.9 ' Second, a state "anticircumvention interest in
limits." 9 2
preventing the evasion of valid contribution
Unfortunately, political contributors who are unable to influence
politics directly because of conventional contribution limits may
"scrambl[e] to find another way to purchase influence." 93
C. Limitations of Existing Approaches
Even the Second Circuit's more stringent and rigorous
analysis has limitations. Judge Richard Posner predicted that
allies of a candidate could run a super PAC and, without
speaking directly to the candidate or party officials, figure out
what type of political advertising would be helpful to the
candidate. 94 Some super PACs have already begun developing
structures to avoid direct communication and interaction with
other political committees and groups. For example, in a 2014

8 Id. at 141 (quoting Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 43 (D.D.C. 2012).
8
See id. at 142-43.
9o See id.
91 Larry Fullerton, FTC Challenges to "Invitationsto Collude", 25 ANTITRUST 30, 33
(2011). See also Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 140 n. 20 (citing Ognibene v. Parks, 671
F.3d 174, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2011)).
92 Vt. Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 140 n. 20 (citing Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 194-95).
3 Vt. Right to Life, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 402 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 165 (2003)). See also CaliforniaMedical Association, 453 U.S. at
198-99.
94 Richard Posner, Unlimited Campaign Spending-A Good Thing?, THE BECKERPOSNER BLOG (April 8, 2012), available at http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/04/
archived at http://perma.cc/
unlimited-campaign-spendinga-good-thing-posner.html,
G5PM-THQK.
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Colorado Senate race, the super PAC Americans for Prosperity
"told the Washington Post it would spend $970,000 on three
weeks of television, radio, and online ads attacking [the]
incumbent Democratic Senator," which signaled to the
Republican candidate that he could focus on fundraising for
future efforts instead of spending on his own attack ads during
that period.9 5
The 2014 midterm elections were rife with such activity.
Many campaigns would publish candidate information in a
format that was easily transferable to ads, or even published
stock video footage of a candidate on the campaign's website
that super PACs could download and use in television spots or
online videos.9 6 One of the most explicit examples of
coordination was performed by the campaign of Thom Tillis, the
Republican senatorial candidate in North Carolina. In October
2014, Tillis's "campaign e-mailed an extensive strategy memo to
anyone who had signed up for updates on Tillis's Web site that
listed [the campaign's] most pressing needs, including to
'increase our spending in Asheville' and 'add 1,000 gross ratings
points in Charlotte."' 9 7 Paul S. Ryan, senior counsel for the
Campaign Legal Center, which has filed complaints with the
FEC about the widespread use of shared video footage in the
2014 campaigns, argued that "the increasing degree of
interaction between candidates and outside groups is rendering
the candidate contribution limits meaningless." 98
Even so, commentators have found the Vermont Right to
Life decision to be a step in the right direction. "'One of the real
crucial points of this decision, though, is to peer behind the veil
of the claim of independence,' said Tara Malloy, senior counsel
at the reform group Campaign Legal Center. 'The fact that the

9 Phil Mattingly, The Super PAC Workaround: How Candidates Quietly, Legally
Communicate, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 28, 2014), available at http://www.businessweek.
com/articles/2014-08-28/how-candidates-communicate-legally-with-super-pacs, archived
at http://perma.cc/LCV6-9A4B.
9 Id.
9 Matea Gold, Election 2014: A new level of collaboration between candidates and
big-money allies, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2014), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/election-2014-a-new-level-of-collaboration-between-candidat
es-and-big-money-allies/2014/11/03/ec2bda9a-636f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67Lstory.html?h
pid=z2, archived at http://perma.cc/5PNA-4ZHL.
98 Id.
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court here is willing to basically look at the evidence of whether
the group is independent' is a positive development." 9 9
Opponents may argue that the proposal to adopt the Second
Circuit's impact of campaign behavior would rely too heavily on
speculation and qualitative data. They may also question
whether adoption of the stricter Second Circuit rule would have
much of an impact on campaign behavior since, regardless of the
distinction between IEOs and DEOs for purposes of contribution
limits, campaign rules regarding communication between official
campaigns and PACs remain in place.1 00 The prior cases,
however, illustrate how concerned courts have been about the
diminished autonomy of IEOs. To satisfy these criticisms about
the effectiveness of the Second Circuit rule in the face of
collusive behavior between IEOs and DEOs, the Court should
look outside the realm of election law for guidance.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A.

The Court Can Use Antitrust Law as a Guidepost for
Applying the Second Circuit's Approach

Whether by coincidence or design, the Second Circuit's
approach to regulating coordination between IEOs and DEOs
closely mirrors that of antitrust law's regulation of coordination
by firms. This similarity in method is unsurprising, considering
the similarity in motive behind the regulations: antitrust law
seeks to protect consumers from the anticompetitive actions of
firms, election law seeks to protect voters (political consumers)
from the coordinated, anticompetitive behavior of expenditure
organizations. Campaign finance law also faces many of the
same regulatory problems as antitrust: "the notion of
'coordination' is vague, and tacit coordination with a candidate
or a party seems to occupy the same never-never land as tacit
collusion in antitrust law."101 By applying the more developed

9 Byron Tau, Court: Super PAC Not Independent Enough, POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2014),
available at http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/07/court-super-pac-notindependent-enough-191488.html, archived at http: //perma.cclFA6D-F5NG.
100 For another example of ways campaigns legally communicate with Super-PACs,
see Sean Sullivan, Super PACs and campaigns can't talk to each other. Here's how they
get around it, THE WASHINGTON POST (April 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/24/super-pacs-and-campaigns-cant-talk-to-each-other-heres
-how-they-get-around-it/, archivedat http://perma.cc/P5EJ-AS95.
'01 Richard Posner, Unlimited Campaign Spending-A Good Thing?, THE BECKER-
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antitrust law regarding collusion to election law, the Court could
further refine the Second Circuit's approach in Vermont Right to
Life to increase deterrence of future illegal coordination and
minimize enforcement costs.
While there is apparently little empirical data on this
particular area of election law, there is a sizable body of
scholarship applying economic rationale to campaign scenarios.
In fact, several prominent legal scholars and economists have
noted the sort of problems with collusion that are likely to exist
between IEOs and DEOs. Speaking to lobbying generally,
Alexander Volokh predicts that "a concentrated industry may be
able to more easily overcome its collective action problems, so we
might expect lobbying to increase as concentration increases." 102
The appearance of a few, large super PACs suggests a trend in
this direction and with fewer IEOs, it might be easier for a few
influential conventional PACs to direct their behavior. In fact,
there has been concern about political parties themselves being
a vehicle for "circumventing FECA's contribution limits since
this money is spent in tacit collusion with elected officials." 103
While the arguments about the applicability of antitrust law
must be further developed, Volokh notes that "privatization is a
form of antitrust, and antitrust is a form of campaign finance
regulation." 104 This suggests that efforts to splinter IEOs and
DEOs are a form of antitrust and may be used to regulate
campaign contributions.10 5

POSNER BLOG, (April 8, 2012), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/04/unlimitedcampaign-spendinga-good-thing-posner.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G5PM-THQK.
102 Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law
and Economics of Political
Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1216 (2008).
103
Eric L. Richards, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican
Federal
Campaign Committee: Implications for Parties, Corporate Political Dialogue, and
Campaign FinanceReform, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 83, 89 (2002).
104 Volokh, supra note 1022,
at 1253.
10 This is not to suggest that the traditional antitrust regulatory agencies (see infra
15 U.S.C. at § 21) have authority to regulate federal election behavior in the context of
independent-expenditure and direct expenditure organizations. While such an argument
could be made, this comment only relies on Volokh's statement in order to argue that
existing antitrust law has developed to deal with similar problems and serves as a useful
guidepost for this particular area of campaign finance law.
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1. Sections of the Sherman Act are applicable to the
regulation of independent-expenditure organizations.
Much of antitrust law comes from Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, which prohibits "contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce."1 06
"The crucial question is whether [the challenged anticompetitive
conduct] . . . stemmed from independent decision or from an
agreement, tacit or express."10 7 The problem in antitrust
litigation, and the corresponding problem in application to
campaign finance, is that "[wihile a showing of parallel business
behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the
fact finder may infer agreement, it falls short of conclusively
establish[ing] agreement or ...
itself constitut[ing] a Sherman
Act offense."108
Furthermore, "[e]ven conscious parallelism, a common
reaction of firms in a concentrated market [that] recogniz[e]
their shared economic interests and their interdependence with
respect to price and output decisions is not in itself unlawful." 109
Purely tacit collusion should not be a per se Sherman Act
violation, therefore, because such a rule would yield too many
false positives.1 10 To avoid summary judgment under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs must produce "evidence that
'tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators
acted independently."11 1 Applying this approach, the Second
Circuit's rule "should have enough content to exclude ... certain
categories of parallel behavior, including some involving benign
forms of communication." 12

15 U.S.C. § 1.
107 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
106

540 (1954).
1os Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) (internal quotations
omitted).
10' Id. at 553-54 (internal quotations omitted).
n0 See William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to ConcertedAction, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 173, 189 (2012).
.n Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
112

Page, supra note 110.
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2. FTC authorized to prevent anti-competitive behavior.
In addition to the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) "is a quasi-judicial, independent regulatory
agency led by five commissioners" that enforces U.S. antitrust
law. 113 The commission was initially created in 1914 to "prevent
unfair methods of competition in commerce as part of the battle
to 'bust the trusts.' 1 14 Since that time, Congress has passed
additional laws granting the Commission authority such that its
mission is now "[t]o prevent business practices that are
anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to consumers; to enhance
informed consumer choice and public understanding of the
competitive process; and to accomplish this without unduly
burdening legitimate business activity." 11 5 Consequently, the
FTC is the only federal agency with jurisdiction for both
consumer protection and competition across the economy.1 16
The FTC regulates anticompetitive conduct under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 117 The Act specifies that
"[t]he Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.""', While
the FTC does not have the authority to regulate under the
Sherman Act like the Department of Justice, its authority under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act closely parallels
that of the Sherman Act. Courts may therefore appropriately
look.,to the FTC for guidance regarding the identification and
regulation of collusive behavior.

Todd N. Hutchison, Understanding the Differences Between the DOJ and the
FTC, ABA Young Lawyers Division, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
young__awyers/publications/the_101_201_practice series/understanding-differences
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/V33K-2EY9.
1
About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM., available at http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc,
archived at http://perma.cc/5KCX-9TJX.
113

115

Id.

116

See id.

11 See 15 U.S.C. §45. See also Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
463-64 (1941).
1
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
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Applications of the "invitation to collude" enforcement
mechanism described in Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.

The FTC has long taken the position that "invitations to
collude" may violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.1 19 Invitations to collude are unilateral solicitations to enter
into unlawful horizontal price-fixing or market allocation
agreements. 120 Historically, the Commission has taken a per se
approach that first internally evaluates the suspected invitation
to collude "in light of factors that bear on the likelihood and
magnitude of its possible anticompetitive effects, including any
purported justifications." 121 If the FTC decides that intervention
is justified based on these factors, then it challenges the conduct
as illegal without any finding that the challenged conduct had
any actual past or present anti-competitive effect, as would
normally be required under Section 1.122
The FTC's regulation of "invitations to collude" is
uncontroversial so long as the communication is private-partly
because this regulation is so far from the normal protection of
free speech-and could be interpreted unambiguously as a
solicitation to enter into an anticompetitive agreement. 123
Similarly, in the context of election law, while the FEC has
comfortably limited private communication between IEOs and
DEOs, it has tended to minimize its regulation of public speech.
Michael Toner, a former FEC commissioner, says stopping
candidates and independent groups from openly disseminating
their plans would be impossible "unless you want to make it
illegal to use information in the public sphere. And I don't know
how that would be manageable or constitutional."1 2 4

-

119 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair methods of
competition." 15 U.S.C. §45.
120
See Fullerton, supra note 91.
121 Fullerton, supra note
91.
122

Id.

See Page, supra note 110, at 184 (focusing on private communication instead of
public price announcements because of the inherently ambiguous purpose of such
facilitating practices).
124
Matea Gold, Election 2014: A new level of collaboration between candidates and
big-money allies, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2014), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/election-2014-a-new-level-of-collaboration-between-candidat
es-and-big-money-allies/2014/11/03/ec2bda9a-636f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html?h
pid=z2, archived at http://perma.cc/5PNA-4ZHL.
123
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At least in the antitrust sphere, the FTC has stretched its
authority to even reach suspected invitations to collude that
were communicated publicly. 125 In Valassis Commc'ns,126 the
FTC alleged that Valassis extended an unlawful invitation to
collude to its only competitor, during a mandatory conference
call with financial analysts. 127 The FTC subsequently issued a
consent order prohibiting Valassis from inviting any further
collusion, while permitting the company "publicly to disclose any
information ...
required by the Federal Securities Laws." 12 8
More recently, the FTC has asserted even broader discretionary
authority over both public and private invitations to collude. 129
In U-Haul Int'l,130 Budget, a shipping competitor, filed a
complaint about U-Haul issuing both private and public
communications announcing price increases and expressing
hope that Budget would match and not "throw the money
away." 131 The FTC, without distinguishing between private and
public communications, stated that in order to infer an
actionable invitation to collude, "[ilt is not essential that the
Commission find repeated misconduct attributable to senior
executives, or define a market, or show market power, or
establish substantial competitive harm, or even find that the
terms of the desired agreement have been communicated with
precision." 132 The resulting final consent order in U-Haul
mirrored the FTC's consent order in Valassis. These holdings
suggest that the FEC may be able to draw parallels to the FTC's
increased authority to regulate public communications. As
described above, however, the Court has generally been wary of

&

125 See Complaint, Valassis Commc'ns, FTC
File No. 051-0008 (Apr. 19, 2006);
Decision & Order, Valassis Commc'ns, FTC File No. 051-0008 (Apr. 19, 2006); Analysis
of Agreement Containing Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, Valassis Commc'ns, 71
Fed. Reg. 13976 (Mar. 20, 2006).
126 ETC File No. 051-0008
(Apr. 19, 2006).
127
Complaint, Valassis Commc'ns, FTC File No. 051-0008, 1 13.f (Apr. 19, 2006).
128 Decision & Order, Valassis Commc'ns,
FTC File No. 051-0008, 3-4 (Apr. 19,
2006).
129
See Complaint, U-Haul Int'l, FTC File No. 081-0157 (July 14, 2010); Decision
Order, U-Haul Int'l, FTC File No. 081-0157 (July 14, 2010); Analysis of Agreement
Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, U-Haul Int'l, 75 Fed. Reg. 35033
(June 21, 2010).
1o FTC File No. 081-0157 (July 14, 2010).
13' Complaint, U-Haul Int'l, FTC File No. 081-0157, 24.a (Apr. 19, 2006).
132 Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, UHaul Int'l, 75 Fed. Reg. 35033, 35035 (June 21, 2010).
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regulations on public speech, particularly political speech.
Consequently, the FEC must be cautious before targeting
publicly communicated invitations to collude and should clearly
indicate to IEOs and DEOs what sort of communication will
qualify as per se collusion. 133
4.

Additional considerations relevant to "invitations to
collude."

Current antitrust literature on "invitations to collude"
suggests at least three factors that the Court should consider
before adopting the Second Circuit's test in cases of public
communication between IEOs and DEOs. 13 4 Each factor
suggests that clearer guidelines will promote more efficient
communications and less accidental collusion by political
organizations.
First, the Court should clarify the line between a public
announcement of the campaign's goals as a means of inciting
increased public support and an invitation to collude. 135 U-Haul
and Valassis identify several factors that help identify when
public communication about product pricing crosses the line to
constituting an invitation to collude: the solicited party is clearly
identified in the communication; the solicited party is the
solicitor's "closest" competitor; the communication includes
specific references to future prices and price policies; an
announced future price is explicitly contingent on the solicited
party's cooperation; and the solicited party is threatened (often
with a price war) if they do not respond favorably. 136 A court
evaluating
suspect
lEO
behavior
could,
with
minor
modifications, rely on these factors to make the inference that a
public announcement is an invitation to collude. For instance, a
public announcement that a campaign plans to spend
advertising money in a certain market as long as a particular
super PAC makes sufficient gains in a different specified market
133 For instance, the FEC must clarify how required contribution
disclosure filings
will be evaluated, since it wants to promote forthrightness by PACs in disclosing, while
simultaneously guarding against collusion.
13' Larry Fullerton, FTC Challenges to "Invitationsto Collude", 25 ANTITRUST 30, 33
(2011).
13s See id. at 33 ("The Commission should clarify the line between an advance public
announcement of a future price increase and an invitation to collude that would be
actionable under Section 5.").
136
Id. at 33.
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would satisfy many of these factors. This approach does a good
job of identifying behavior such as the prior example of Thom
Tillis's public strategy email listing the campaign's most
pressing needs, including increasing spending in Asheville and
adding 1,000 ratings points in Charlotte, as an invitation to
collude.
Next, the Court "should clarify the market characteristics
that support an inference of likely anticompetitive harm." 137 In
Valassis, the FTC said that liability should depend in part on
the "context of the communication."1 38 While the FTC did not
make clear what characteristics should be taken into account,
factors such as whether the communication is only applicable to
a single super PAC might be enough to support an inference of
harm. A highly concentrated market of political donors also
might be sufficient to support such an inference. This move to
improve competition in the political speech market follows a
strong trend within free speech law to avoid limiting speech so
that conflicting ideas can compete amongst themselves,
resulting in the supremacy of the best ideas. 139 While the Court
has found "equality" not to be a legitimate interest in campaign
finance law, 140 the government clearly has some interest in
minimizing market concentration of donors. "Experimental
economics suggests that collusion without communication is rare
and dependent upon highly specific conditions." 14 1 In particular,
while collusion without communication seems to be possible in
duopolies, it is far less likely in markets with at least three
firms, generally because firms will have a harder time
disciplining defections.1 42 Existing campaign contribution limits
help produce this ideal diversified political market and the

13' See id.
138 Analysis of Agreement

Containing Consent Order To Aid Public Comment,
Valassis Commc'ns, 71 Fed. Reg. 13976, 13978 (Mar. 20, 2006).
139 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
140 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54 ("The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative
financial resources of candidates competing for elective office . . . is clearly not sufficient
to justify the provision's infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights").
141 Page, supra note 110, at 191 (citing Charles A. Holt, Industrial Organization:A
Survey of Laboratory Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 409

(John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1997) (summarizing the literature as finding that
duopolies are able to coordinate price, in part, because rivals can punish non-cooperative
behavior without hurting cooperative rivals; above three participants, however, there is
little evidence of a "pure numbers effect" in price coordination)).
142

Id.
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campaign contributors as a proxy for greater political
market participation.
Finally, the Court should clarify what justifications it will
recognize and in what circumstances. 143 In the Valassis and UHaul consent orders, the FTC only specifically recognized one
justification-the need to make "required" securities disclosures.
In the context of election law, the FEC could specify that making
required contribution and expenditure disclosures qualifies as a
justification for making statements that would otherwise
constitute invitations to collude. In any case, it is important that
the FEC specify these exceptions ahead of time so that
organizations will be willing to disclose information freely
without fear of punishment.
Benefits of the Antitrust-Based Approach

B.

The primary benefits of emulating an antitrust-based
analysis of collusive behavior is that it has already been applied
elsewhere-so its efficacy may be evaluated-and that it is
more developed and specified than existing election law
approaches. In particular, clearer guidelines will allow political
organizations to operate with less risk of accidentally violating
FEC rules. For this reason, it is important that the FEC clarifies
any justifiable exceptions to its prohibition on potentially
collusive communication, particularly to the extent that the
modified U-haul/Valassis factors conflict with existing disclosure
requirements. Additionally, the breadth of the U-haul/Valassis
factors should allow the FEC to capture more of the
"scrambling" behavior of parties seeking to circumvent
traditional contribution limits.
Implications of Increased Regulation Under the Second
Circuit's Approach

C.

Economic analysis of campaign behavior is useful in
explaining how PACs will respond to changes in their incentive
structure caused by the Second Circuit's approach. While
increased regulation is likely to drive some political contributors

143

See Fullerton, supra note 911, at 33.
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into other "underground" markets 144 where they can donate
without expenditure limitations, the act of criminalizing the use
of supposedly independent expenditure organizations as a front
for direct donations by regulated organizations like PACs will
discourage some collaboration simply based on the social costs of
engaging in illicit behavior. 145
The political donation market is not perfectly inelastic, 146
and there is no perfect substitute for this particular contribution
structure.1 4 7 Consequently, some subset of the PACs currently
donating through IEOs in the manner described in Vermont
Right to Life will be "priced out" of the direct contribution
market. Some organizations' demand will still be too inelastic to
be forced out since those organizations still want to exert
political influence through more direct contributions, even if
such behavior becomes significantly more expensive. The
increase in "price" created by the Second Circuit's approach,
however, should reduce the volume of direct, unregulated
campaign expenditures.
Assuming that such reduction is a social good-as
previously discussed, First Amendment law seems to be based
on this assumption-this change should be social welfare
enhancing. It should be noted that such an assumption is no
sure thing, since some self-interested political advocacy could
promote interests that benefit society. 148 While this Comment
does not seek to make such a calculation formally, a future
article could attempt to calculate the cost of increased regulation
and contrast this with the benefit of reduced direct campaign
contributions. However, the same economic reasoning suggests

144
Gary S. Becker et al., The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs, 114 J.
POLIT. EcONOMY 38, 40 (2006) ("[S]ome producers may go underground to try to avoid a
monetary tax.").
141 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulationof Criminal Code Rules, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951, 953 (2003).
146 See Becker et al., supra note 144 (discussing other goods that may be thought of
as perfectly inelastic, such as the supply of land or illicit narcotics for a drug addict).
141 "Price elasticities of giving in the United States have largely been estimated to be
greater than one in absolute value," indicating that the supply curve for such
contributions (including political contributions) is relatively flat and elastic. Bruce
Chapman, Between Markets and Politics: A Social Choice Theoretic Appreciation of the
CharitableSector, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 821, 857 n. 72 (1998).
148 See Volokh, supra note 102, at 1247-49 (2008) (discussing how self-interested
advocacy of prison privatization could be advocating a policy that is welfare enhancing).
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that if demand for such donations is relatively inelastic, then the
social cost of enforcing regulations is high. 149
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court grants certiorari
to hear Vermont Right to Life, the Second Circuit's decision has
opened a new debate on the appropriate regulatory structure to
manage increased collaboration between DEOs and IEOs. There
are a variety of approaches that the Supreme Court could adopt
to resolve the debate, several of which provide relatively simple
and inexpensive solutions. Unfortunately, these approaches do
not provide the comprehensive regulation needed to separate the
organizations. The Second Circuit's approach, while broader and
more difficult to implement, does a better job of dealing with the
bad incentives for DEOs to control IEOs.
The Court should consider shaping any modifications to the
Second Circuit's approach on the model provided by U.S.
antitrust law. In particular, the FTC's approach to identifying
potentially problematic collusive behavior provides excellent
guidance
for future regulation
of interaction between
independent-expenditure-only political committees and direct
expenditure organizations.

149

See Becker et al., supra note 144.

